This paper uses a rich set of geo-coded administrative and remotely sensed data on more than 1 million agricultural land transactions in Ukraine to explore how informality, size, and recent land reforms affect land prices. Three main findings are highlighted. First, absence of registered rights generates large negative externalities, the size of which plausibly exceeds the cost of registering all land. By contrast, informality of lease contracts is a choice that may enable owners to evade regulatory obstacles that prevent them from renegotiating contracts to obtain more favorable terms. Second, while land market liberalization generated significant indirect benefits, gains are unevenly distributed. Furthermore, competition in sales markets remains limited, pointing to scope for measures—including reducing the transaction costs of selling land and accessing mortgage finance, improving publicity of pending land sales, and use of electronic auctions—to enhance the reforms’ impact on efficiency and equity. Third, size at the parcel, field, and farm levels is associated with higher per hectare prices, pointing to scope for market-based land consolidation and growth of medium-size farms to increase land values and productivity. Achieving this potential will require measures to limit speculative land acquisition and exercise of market power by making local land markets more competitive and using market-based land valuation as a basis for taxing land on a recurrent basis and any capital gains due to land appreciation. Official version of document can be found here.
Klaus Deininger, Daniel Ayalew Ali
Policy Research Working Paper
2024, World Bank Group – Washington, D.C.